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ABSTRACT 
Four intuitions are recurrent and influential in theories about conditionals: the Ramsey’s test, 
the Adams’ Thesis, the Equation, and the robustness requirement. For simplicity’s sake, I call 
these intuitions ‘the big four’. My aim is to show that: (1) the big four are interdependent; (2) 
they express our inferential dispositions to employ a conditional on a modus ponens; (3) the 
disposition to employ conditionals on a modus ponens doesn’t have the epistemic 
significance that is usually attributed to it, since the acceptability or truth conditions of a 
conditional is not necessarily associated with its employability on a modus ponens. 
1. THE BIG FOUR ARE A TIGHT BUNCH 
The following principles have been 
influential in the theorisation about 
conditionals: 
Ramsey’s Test (RT): we accept A → B  if, 1
and only if, after the hypothetical addition 
of A to our belief system, and after making 
the required adjustments to maintain 
consistency without modifying the 
hypothetical belief in A, we would be 
willing to accept B .  2
Adams’ Thesis (AT): As(A → B) = Pr(B/A) 
= Pr(A&B)/Pr(A), provided that Pr(A) > 0 .  3
The Equation (TE): Pr(A → B) = Pr(B/A) = 
Pr(A&B)/Pr(A), provided that Pr(A) > 0 .  4
Robustness Requirement (RR): A → B is 
acceptable when A ⊃  B is robust with 
respect to A, i.e., when Pr(A ⊃  B) is high 
and would remain high after learning that 
A .  5
AT should be read as ‘The assertibility of A 
→ B is measured by the conditional 
probability of B given A’. It is arguable that 
AT and TE are synonymous, since the 
degree in which we are justified in asserting 
a proposition P is measured by the 
probability we attribute to P. In fact, in his 
 I will use ‘→’ for indicative conditionals, ‘⊃’ for the material implication and the capital letters A, B, C…. for 1
propositional variables. The symbols and variables quoted will be modified to ensure that the notation remains 
uniform.
 Stalnaker (1968: 102). This is the modified and more widely discussed formulation of the test. The original 2
idea and formulation can be found in Ramsey (1929: 143).
 Adams (1965: 172).3
 Jeffrey (1964: 702–3).4
 Jackson (1987: 28). Jackson’s notion of robustness is inspired on Skyrms’ notion of resilience. See Skyrms 5
(1975).
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later writings Adams presented his thesis in 
t e r m s o f p r o b a b i l i t y r a t h e r t h a n 
assertibility . The only reason why AT and 6
TE are taken to be different is that Adams 
didn't believe that conditionals have truth-
conditions. The problem, however, is that 
AT becomes unintell igible in case 
conditionals have no truth-value. If the 
probability of A → B is not the probability 
of A → B being true, what else should it be?  
RR states that A → B is acceptable when 
A ⊃ B is robust with respect to A, i.e., when 
Pr(A ⊃  B) is high and would remain high 
after learning that A. But since A ⊃  B is 
logically equivalent to ¬A ∨  B, the 
probability of A ⊃ B given A is equal to the 
probability of ¬A ∨ B given A, which on its 
turn is tantamount to the probability of B 
given A . Thus, RR is satisfied when AT is 7
satisfied. Since we already accepted that AT 
and TE are one and the same, RR, AT and 
TE are equivalent.  
If the probability of A ⊃  B is high and 
would remain high after learning that A, I 
would be willing to infer B after learning 
that A, but this is precisely what would 
happen if we would be willing to infer B 
after the hypothetical addition of A to our 
belief system. Thus, RR and RT are linked.  
The big four share the same counter-
intuitive aspects. Suppose ‘A’ and ‘B’ stand 
for necessarily true propositions: ‘two plus 
two equals four’ and ‘five is an odd number’ 
respectively. In such scenario, the 
probability I assign to B given A is high 
simply in virtue of the probability of B 
being high. The fact that the propositions 
lack mutual relevance does not affect the 
conditional probability. Since Pr(B/A) is 
high, the probability of ‘If two plus two 
equals four, then five is an odd number’ 
must be high according to the equation, and 
acceptable according to the AT. This also 
implies that RT is satisfied: if I add ‘two 
plus two equals four’ to my belief system, I 
would be willing to infer that ‘five is an odd 
number’ simply because I have already 
accepted that five is an odd number. In this 
case, the RR is also satisfied, since the 
probability that ‘five is an odd number’ is 
high and would remain high after learning 
that ‘two plus two equals four’. In this case, 
I would be willing to employ ‘If two plus 
two equals four, then five is an odd number’ 
in a modus ponens, trivially. If learn that 
‘two plus two equals four’, I cannot avoid 
inferring that ‘five is an odd number’, since 
I already accept that ‘five is an odd 
number’.  
The big four also share the same 
limitations. AT and TE don’t provide any 
answers when A is necessarily false, since 
the conditional probability of B given A is 
undetermined . The RT can’t be applied 8
when A is necessarily false, because I 
cannot add A hypothetically to my belief 
system. Finally, RR can’t be satisfied when 
A is necessarily false, because I don’t know 
if the probability of B would remain higher 
after learning that A because I can’t learn 
that A to begin with. Not surprisingly, I 
can’t employ A → B on a modus ponens, 
because A is always false. 
One could argue that there is a tension 
between RT and RR since there is a 
difference between the degree of belief in B 
given the hypothetical assumption that A, 
and the degree of belief in B given the belief 
that A. Suppose that Mary does not have a 
high degree of belief that God exists on the 
hypothesis that her daughter is dangerously 
 Adams (1975; 1988).6
 Jackson (1987: 28).7
 Of course, this doesn’t mean that we can’t modify the principle to surpass these limitations. Ernest Adams 8
himself conceded that the probability of a conditional should be 1 in case the probability of its antecedent is 0. 
See Adams (1965: 185). 
!2
ill, but she would become a devote Cristian, 
if she were to learn that her daughter was 
dangerously ill. In this example the degree 
of belief in B given the hypothesis that A is 
low, i.e., it fails at RT, but the degree of 
belief in B given the belief that A is high, 
i.e., it passes RR .  9
One explanation for this phenomenon is 
that while there are could be a difference 
between what the epistemic agent expects to 
be her beliefs given the hypothetical 
assumption of a fact and her actual beliefs 
given the occurrence of facts, after the 
occurrence of the fact the hypothetical 
conditional probability must catch up with 
the actual conditional probability, on pain of 
incoherence . In o ther words , any 
inconsistencies between RT and RR are 
naturally dissolved.   
2. THE CONNECTION WITH MODUS PONENS 
The connection between the big four and 
modus ponens is made obvious by RR, 
which is built on Jackson’s reasoning about 
the relation between assertion and 
robustness . Every proposition is robust in 10
relation to itself, since the probability of a 
proposition will remain high after its own 
discovery. Thus, the relevant notion of 
robustness is the one that is relative between 
two or more propositions. In some cases, 
the context will indicate in relation to which 
propositions our assertion is robust, but the 
context is not always enough. So, Jackson 
insisted, we need conventions to signal in 
relation to which propositions are our 
assertions relatively robust. That’s when 
conditionals come in. They are conventional 
symbols that signalise the robustness of one 
proposition, in this case, the consequent, in 
relation to another, the antecedent: 
What is the point of signalling the 
robustness of A ⊃ B with respect to A? The 
answer lies in the importance of being able 
to use Modus Ponens. Although ‘A ⊃ B; A; 
therefore, B’ is certainly valid, there is a 
difficulty about using it in practice. Suppose 
my evidence makes A ⊃ B highly probable, 
but that I have no evidence concerning A. B 
is of interest to me, so I set about finding 
evidence for A if l can. The difficulty is that 
finding evidence that makes A highly 
probable is not enough in itself for me to 
conclude B by Modus Ponens. For the 
evidence that makes A probable may make 
A ⊃  B improbable. Indeed, it is easy to 
prove from the calculus that, except in 
special cases of extreme probability, Pr(A ⊃ 
B/A) < Pr(A ⊃ B). Normally, on learning A I 
must lower the probability I give (A ⊃  B), 
so endangering the inference to B. It is thus 
of particular interest whether or not A ⊃ B’s 
high probabil i ty would be unduly 
diminished by learning A; that is, it is 
important whether or not A ⊃  B is robust 
with respect to A. In sum, we must 
distinguish the validity of Modus Ponens 
from its utility in a situation where I believe 
A ⊃ B but do not know A. The robustness of 
A ⊃  B relative to A is what is needed to 
ensure the utility of Modus Ponens in such 
situations . 11
In other words, we are not only 
interested in whether A → B is highly 
probable or not, but we are also interested in 
knowing whether they are inferentially 
useful or not, and this will happen when A 
⊃  B is robust with respect to A, which also 
 The example is suggested by Stalnaker (1984: 104).9
 Jackson (1987: 26).10
 Jackson (1987: 29).11
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ensures the high conditional probability of B 
given A, witch satisfies AT, TE and RT. 
Thus, the big four implies that A → B is 
acceptable (or true) when A → B is 
employable in a modus ponens.  
That someone may be lead into thinking 
that modus ponens is central to our theories 
about conditionals is understandable given 
the fact that the grammatical form of 
conditional sentences invite inferences is 
one of the marked differences of 
conditionals in relation to categorical 
propositions. In logic textbooks, the 
standard example of a conditional sentence 
is ‘If A, then B’, and other less usual 
examples include ‘B because A’, ‘B given 
A’, ‘There is no B, unless there is A’ and 
‘Since A, B’. All these forms suggest an 
inferential passage from A to B. It is also 
usual to name the subordinate clause, A, as 
‘antecedent’, and the main clause, B, as 
‘consequent’, which naturally predispose us 
to think that B comes after A. The very 
name of the sentence in natural language, 
i.e., ‘conditional’, suggests that A must be a 
condition for B, which makes us think that 
B must be inferable from A. These sentences 
were also called ‘hypotheticals’ in the past. 
The name maybe now in disuse, but it was 
also motivated by the directional and 
grammatical form of conditional sentences, 
since the term ‘if’ apparently indicates that 
the antecedent is assumed as a hypothesis 
used in an inference directed to the 
consequent.   
This inferential passage is also 
suggested by the symbols used to represent 
the logical form of conditionals. This 
happens because our conventions regarding 
the logical form of conditionals are already 
imbedded with grammatical induced 
prejudices, as is attested by the fact that 
logical symbols used to represent 
conditional operators (‘→’, ‘⊃’, ‘⇒’, etc.) 
point in a direction from A to B. 
It is natural then (even though it is 
ultimately mistaken) to assume that they 
provide a reliable indicator of conditionals’ 
truth conditions or acceptability conditions.  
3. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE BIG FOUR 
There is one puzzle that demonstrates in a 
compelling manner why the acceptance or 
the truth conditions of a conditional cannot 
be determined by its employability on a 
modus ponens. RR states that A → B is 
acceptable when Pr(A ⊃  B) is high and 
would remain high after learning that A, 
which also implies Pr(B) is high and would 
remain high after learning that A. Here is 
another way to define RR: A → B is 
acceptable when Pr(B) and Pr(B/A) are both 
high and close to each other. The following 
example seems to show these definitions are 
independent. Suppose I’m certain that I 
would never know that my wife is deceiving 
me; she is too smart to get caught. However, 
because I trust her, I don’t believe she is 
deceiving me. In this case, the conditional 
probability that I don’t know that she is 
deceiving me given that she is deceiving me 
is high. Nevertheless, I would not infer that 
I don’t know that she is deceiving me given 
that I found out that she is deceiving me. In 
this case, the conditional ‘If my wife is 
deceiving him, I would never know’ is not 
acceptable according to the first definition 
of robustness, but it is acceptable according 
to the second definition of robustness .  12
The idea that motivates this counter-
example is that in some cases B can be 
 The example is from Van Fraassen (1980: 503). 12
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robust in relation to A, but not in relation to 
the acceptance of A. This is important for 
our purposes because it shows that a 
conditional can be acceptable even though it 
is not employable in a modus ponens. 
Bennett attempts to explain this counter-
example by arguing that the speaker will not 
be willing to employ the conditional in a 
modus ponens but believes that any other 
person that accepts the conditional would be 
willing to employ it on a modus ponens . 13
This explanation, however, is ad hoc. 
One immediate answer to this counter-
example is that we should stick to the 
second definition of robustness. After all, 
since Pr(B/A) is defined as Pr(A&B)/Pr(A), 
and given that it is possible to determine the 
value of the last equation without assuming 
the truth of A, we could attribute a high 
value to Pr(A&B)/Pr(A) in the example 
mentioned above even if the Pr(B) is zero 
after learning that A . But this solution 14
seems to be a desperate movie. The reason 
why the conditional probability is 
intuitively relevant to our understanding of 
conditionals is due to the apparent relation 
between the acceptance of A → B and our 
willingness to infer B given the assumption 
of A, and not the quotient of A & B given 
the probability of A . 15
There is also always a case to be made 
that conditional probability is primitive , 16
i.e., that Pr(B/A) can’t be defined as 
Pr(A&B)/Pr(A). Intuitively, I can attribute a 
high probability to B given the assumption 
of A even if I don’t know the probability of 
A. For instance, I can attribute a high 
probability to the ceremony being cancelled 
tomorrow given the assumption that there 
will be a heavy rainfall, even if I don’t 
know the probability that there will be a 
heavy rainfall tomorrow. Thus, even if the 
second definition of robustness seem to 
work in this case, it will bring even more 
problems than it solves.  
4. THE BIG FOUR REAL SIGNIFICANCE 
The attempt to maintain the relevance of the 
conditional probability by reducing it to 
something else only clouds the issue. In 
fact, there is a simpler explanation for this 
case: our inferential dispositions are 
determined by the reasons that lead us to 
accept the conditional. This explains why 
the big four result in so many false 
negatives. For example, some conditionals 
are accepted only when we are willing to 
employ the conditional in a modus tollens 
inference, instead of a modus ponens. When 
I accept ‘If John’s speaking the truth, I'm a 
Dutchman’, I am not willing to infer that I 
am a Dutchman if it turns out that John was 
telling the truth: the conditional was 
asserted under the assumption that the 
antecedent is false. In this case, I accept A 
→ B only when I’m willing to infer ¬A 
from ¬B in a modus tollens inference. Now 
with this mindset we can understand what 
really happened in the counter-example. 
When I accept the conditional ‘If my wife is 
deceiving me, I will never know’, I am not 
willing to infer that I will never know that 
she is deceiving me if I found out that she is 
deceiving me after all. In this case, I have 
good reasons to accept the conditional, but 
 Bennett (2003: 55).13
 Lewis (1986: 155–6).14
 Notice that Jackson abandoned AT since then, accusing it of being motivated by an illusory intuitive 15
probability we tend to associate with conditionals. See Jackson (2006: 15; 2008: 462). This error theory mindset 
was already present, although in less explicit form, in Jackson (1987: 38-40) and (1998). 
 I’m not alone. Hájek (2003: 315) presents a long list of proponents of this view.16
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they prevent me from employing the 
conditional in a modus ponens or in a modus 
tollens. This shows that the assumption that 
employability on modus ponens determines 
the truth-conditions of conditionals confuses 
our inferential dispositions, an epistemic 
phenomenon related to our reasons to accept 
a conditional, with its truth conditions, 
which is a logical phenomenon that is 
independent of our reasons and related 
inferential dispositions. 
Thus, the big four are acceptable only if 
they are interpreted as follows: a conditional 
is acceptable if, and only if, our disposition 
to employ it in an inference is compatible 
with the reasons that lead us to accept it in 
the first place. The big four are not 
particularly impressive in this new form. It 
is trivially true that in most cases our 
inferential dispositions are determined by 
our reasons to accept a conditional, but that 
is not a universal principle, as the deceiving 
wife case makes clear.   
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The essence of the big four lies in the 
m o d u s p o n e n s e m p l o y a b i l i t y o f 
conditionals, but this feature is too 
superficial to work as the foundation of a 
general theory. Perhaps more importantly, 
we should cons ider what a re the 
consequences of the present mindset for 
theories that are either based or are heavily 
influenced by the big four. There are 
reasons to think this is the case. Let’s 
consider the suppositional view, according 
to which conditionals are not propositions, 
but acts of conditional assertion. The idea is 
that there is no assertion of A → B, but an 
assertion of B given the assumption of A . 17
This hypothesis has both RT and AT as 
obvious sources of inspiration, so it is not 
surprising that it faces the same limitations. 
When I assert the conditional ‘If John’s 
speaking the truth, I'm a Dutchman’, I’m 
not asserting that I am a Dutchman given 
the assumption that John is speaking the 
truth. Another example involves the 
possible world semantics, which are 
motivated by the RT . They are also 18
inadequate to explain the truth conditions of 
Dutch conditionals since in the closest 
world in which John’s speaking the truth, 
I’m not a Dutchman. Skyrms (2013) also 
argued that AT and the possible world 
semantics are associated, which should be 
another reason to doubt these theories. It 
seems that many influential theories are 
compromised by a modus ponenscentric 
view of conditionals associated with the big 
four.   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